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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
to the expense, effort and anxiety of a criminal defense 2 when he has
been acquitted, in a court of competent jurisdiction, of an essential
element of the crime. The prosecution should not be tempted to pro-
ceed with an incompletely prepared case, knowing it will have the
opportunity to try again. To allow this approach is to defeat certainty
in criminal law and foster disrespect for the judicial system. Most of
the problems in this and similar cases of successive prosecutions could
be avoided by requiring the state to charge, in a single indictment,
all offenses growing out of the same transaction.43
LOSS CARRYOVERS UNDER TILE 1954 CODE:
REJECTION OF THE LIBSON SHOPS DOCTRINE
Taxpayer corporation, which had sustained losses in the hardware
business, entered into an agreement with two partners engaged in
real estate development whereby a department of real estate develop-
ment was established within the corporation. Funds needed for the
department's operations were furnished by the partners through the
purchase of non-voting preferred stock valued at approximately two-
fifths of the total value of the corporate stock. By the terms of the
agreement, ninety percent of the profits of the department were to
be distributed to the preferred stockholders. Voting control of the
common stock was placed in a voting trust. Thereafter, the hardware
business was discontinued and the real estate department operated
at a profit. In filing income tax returns, the corporation offset the
past losses of the hardware business against profits of the real estate
department. The Commissioner's disallowance of the loss carryover1
was upheld by the Tax Court on the basis that there was not the
continuity of business enterprise between the hardware business and
the real estate development required by the so-called Libson Shops
doctrine.2 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
42 See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).43 This is the solution adopted in MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08(2) (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1956).
1 Net operating loss carryovers permit a form of income "averaging" by allowing
a corporation to reduce taxable income in a profitable year by offsetting losses of prior
years. Section 172 of the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 provides that a net operating loss
can be carried back as far as the third year preceding the loss, and offset against tax-
able income of those years. If this carryback does not absorb the loss the remainder
may be carried forward for as many as five years. See generally Brody, Net Operating
Loss Deduction, 34 TAXES 325, 326-38 (1956).
2 See text accompanying note 14 infra.
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Held: In single corporation cases involving post-1954 carryovers, the
statutory restrictions provided in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
are exclusive; when these restrictions do not apply, the Libson Shops
doctrine may not be used to disallow the carryover. Maxwell Hard-
ware Co. v. Commissioner, 343 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1965).'
Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 there were two basic
devices for controlling carryovers. The sole statutory restriction dis-
allowed the carryover if control of a corporation was acquired for
the principal purpose of securing a tax benefit the purchaser would
not otherwise have enjoyed.4 The case law restriction was based on
an interpretation of the words "the taxpayer" in the carryover pro-
vision' and was held to mean the corporate entity, as opposed to the
shareholders, with the result that availability of the carryover de-
pended solely upon retention of the jural entity.' Some modification
of this strict entity approach was made in the case of statutory
mergers,7 but, at the time the 1954 Code was drafted, both statutory
and judicial controls were felt to be unsatisfactory. In an attempt
to base the carryover on "economic realities" instead of merely the
form of the transaction,' Congress added sections 381 and 382. Section
3 Discussed in Brock, Past, Present and Future of Net Operating Loss Carryovers,
43 Taxes 586 (1965).
4 INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 129, added by ch. 63, § 128, 58 Stat. 47 (1944). Section
129 was re-enacted in the 1954 Code, without substantial change, as § 269. The Govern-
ment was generally unsuccessful under § 129 because of the difficulty of proving that
the principal purpose of the transaction was tax avoidance. E.g., Alcorn Wholesale
Co., 16 T.C. 75 (1951); WAGE, Inc., 19 T.C. 249 (1952). See generally BiTTKER,
FEDERAL IxcOmE TAxATioN OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARMHoDERs 52 (1959).
r INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 122(b) (1), added by ch. 619, § 153, 56 Stat 847 (1942),
provided, "If for any taxable year... the taxpayer has a net operating loss.... " (Em-
phasis added.) The words "the taxpayer" were omitted in § 172 of the 1954 Code,
which provides, "There shall be allowed as a deduction .... " Legal writers have
argued over the significance, if any, of the change. See, e.g., Levine & Petta, Libson
Shops: A Study in Semantics, 36 TAxEs 445, 452-53 (1958) ; Speiller, Acquisitions
by Loss Corporations of Profitable Businesses, 40 TAXES 22, 28 (1962) ; Comment, 15
AsH. & LEE L. REv. 135, 140-41 (1958).
6 The Supreme Court adopted the entity theory in New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helver-
ing, 292 U.S. 435 (1934). The loss corporation transferred its assets to a newly
organized corporation in exchange for stock. Although the new corporation was vir-
tually the same as the old, the Court disallowed the carryover because the two cor-
porations "were not identical, but distinct." 292 U.S. at 441. Subsequently, carryovers
were disallowed in a number of cases involving successor corporations. E.g., Brandon
Corp. v. Commissioner, 71 F.2d 762 (4th Cir. 1934) ; 3. M. Smucker Co. v. Keystone
Stores Corp., 12 F. Supp. 286 (W.D. Penn. 1935), aff'd sub nom., Franklin v. United
States, 83 F.2d 1010 (3rd Cir. 1936). The carryover could easily be preserved by
making certain that the loss corporation was the survivor in a reorganization. See
Comment, 69 YALE L.J. 1201, 1211 (1960). The entity theory also permitted the carry-
over after purchase of a loss corporation by new interests and complete change of
business. Alprosa Watch Corp., 11 T.C. 240 (1948).
7 Stanton Brewery, Inc. v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1949).
8 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1954).
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381, dealing with multiple corporation cases,9 emphasizes the non-rec-
ognition sections of the 1954 Code, and provides that, in an acquisition
of one corporation's assets by another in certain tax-free transactions,"°
the acquiring corporation shall receive the carryovers of the acquired
corporation. Section 382 (b) limits the carryover if the shareholders of
the loss corporation retain less than twenty per cent of the stock of the
acquiring corporation.' Section 382(a) was intended to reach single
corporation cases not covered by section 269.12 Under section 382 (a),
the carryover will be disallowed if fifty per cent of the voting stock of
the loss corporation changes hands and the corporation fails to continue
substantially the same business." Three years after passage of the 1954
Code, the United States Supreme Court held, in Libson Shops, Inc. v.
Koehler,14 that when sixteen corporations had merged into the taxpayer,
pre-merger losses of three of the corporations could not be offset
under the 1939 Code against post-merger profits of the other corpora-
tions, because there was no "continuity of business enterprise." Al-
though Libson Shops involved a merger or multiple corporation situa-
tion, lower courts subsequently extended the principle of the case to
disallow carryovers in single corporation cases, arising under the 1939
9 "Multiple corporation" situations are those involving some form of tax-free re-
organization or merger, while "single corporation" situations are those involving
purchase of assets in a taxable transaction with no change in the jural entity of the
loss corporation.
3o The transactions covered by § 381 are: liquidation of a subsidiary under § 332,
unless § 334(b) (2) applies; and reorganizations under § 368(a) (1) (A), (C), (D),
or (F). See generally BrrrKm, op. cit. supra note 4, at 37.
11 Section 382(b) (1) provides that, after certain transactions, a carryforward will
be reduced if:
the stockholders (immediately before the reorganization) of... [the loss corpora-
tion] as a result of owning stock of loss corporation, own (immediately after the
reorganization) less than 20 per cent of the fair market value of the outstanding
stock of the acquiring corporation.
See generally BiTTiER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 64-65.
12 S. REp. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1954).
13 INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 382 provides in part:
(a) (1) (A) [If] any one or more of those persons.. .own a percentage of the
total fair market value of the outstanding stock of such corporation which is at
least 50 percentage points more than such person or persons owned at-
(i) the beginning of such taxable year...
(B) [If] the increase... is attributable to-
(i) a purchase by such person or persons of such stock...
(C) [If] such corporation has not continued to carry on a trade or business
substantially the same as that conducted before any change in the percentage
ownership... the net operating loss carryovers... shall not be included in
the net operating loss deduction.
(c) Definition of Stock-For the purposes of this section, "stock" means all shares
except nonvoting stock which is limited and preferred as to dividends.
For an excellent analysis of §§ 381 and 382 see Comment, 69 YALE LJ. 1201, 1238-67
(1960).
14353 U.S. 382 (1957), 71 HAv. L. REv. 190 (1957), 43 IowA L. Rv. 669 (1958).
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Code. " The Libson Shops doctrine appeared, in at least some multiple
corporation cases, to be superseded by section 381 of the 1954 Code.1"
In single corporation cases, the question became whether section
382(a) replaced Libson Shops and, along with section 269, was to
be the exclusive regulator of post-1954 carryovers, a question directly
considered for the first time in the principal case.
The Ninth Circuit initially noted that the result in Libson Shops
could not be reached under the 1954 Code. The court then stated
that, "by enacting the 1954 Code, Congress destroyed the preceden-
tial value of the rule of decision of Libson Shops... "1 Following
this summary rejection of Libson Shops, the court proceeded with
a more detailed argument. Section 382 (a) was found inapplicable
because the non-voting stock purchased by the partners fell outside
the technical definition of "stock" given in section 382 (c). 1 Similarly,
section 269 did not apply because, although the partner's primary
purpose in entering the transaction was tax avoidance, the partners
did not acquire fifty per cent of the voting power or fair market
value of the outstanding stock." Relying on the legislative history of
sections 381 and 382, the court found congressional intent to promote
certainty by providing an objective standard governing the availabil-
ity of carryovers, a policy which would be defeated by application
of Libson Shops. Furthermore, section 382 superseded Libson Shops
by dealing specifically and differently with the concept of continuity
of business enterprise. Therefore, in single corporation cases, the
statutory remedies of sections 382(a) and 269 were held by the court
to be exclusive.
It should be emphasized at the outset that because the 1954 Code
treats carryovers differently in multiple and single corporation cases,
15 Huyler's v. Commissioner, 327 F.2d 767 (7th Cir. 1964), affirming 38 T.C. 773
(1962) ; J. G. Dudley Co. v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 750 (4th Cir. 1962) ; Commissioner
v. Virginia Metal Products, Inc., 290 F.2d 675 (3rd Cir. 1961) ; Willingham v. United
States. 289 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1961) ; Mill Ridge Coal Co. v. Patterson, 264 F.2d 713
(5th Cir. 1959).
16 See Sinrich, Libson Shops-An Argument Against Its Application Under the
19.54 Code, 13 TAx L. REv. 167, 171-72 (1958).
17 343 F.2d at 716.
1I See note 13 supra.
10 The Commissioner argued that the ancillary agreement-establishing the voting
trust and dividend provisions-showed that, in reality, the "preferred stock" was voting
storl. Brief for Respondent, p. 53a. This argument was wholly unsuccessful under
392(a), but was considered by the court under § 269. The court admitted that, bad
the voting trust been shown to be under the control of the partners, "the case would
be different." 343 F2d at 721. It may be that a reasonable interpretation of either§ 269 or § 382(a) would have favored disallowance under one of these sections, and
made discussion of Libsat Shops unnecessary.
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rejection of Libson Shops raises two distinct questions. First, should
the doctrine be applied in single corporation transactions where sec-
tions 382(a) and 269 are technically inapplicable, but there is clear
abuse of the carryover privilege? Second, should the doctrine be
applied in those multiple corporation transactions omitted from sec-
tion 381?20 The Ninth Circuit was faced only with the first question,
and its sweeping rejection of Libson Shops should be regarded as
dictum insofar as it applies to multiple corporation cases.
The difference asserted by the court between the Libson Shops
doctrine and the limitations of section 382(a) is not adequately de-
fined, but one of two arguments seems implied." First, the Libson
Shops doctrine could be said to disallow carryovers when there is
a change of business even though there is no change of ownership.
Section 382(a) would then be found to supersede Libson Shops by
adding the requirement of change of ownership. While Libson Shops
could arguably be applied in single corporation cases in which only
a change of business has occurred,22 in fact the courts have not dis-
allowed a carryover unless there was some change of ownership.23
Conceivably, the Ninth Circuit failed to recognize this dual require-
ment of the doctrine, and thus overlooked the basically similar ap-
proach of section 382(a) and Libson Shops. On the other hand, the
court may have been concerned with Congress' desire to provide
not merely a change of business requirement, but also an objective
test for determining when such change has occurred. Thus, the second
interpretation of the doctrine in single corporation cases would be
that Libson Shops requires both a change of business and of owner-
20 Section 381 does not apply to a "type (B)" reorganization under § 368, certain
insolvency reorganizations, sales of stock in pursuance of orders of the Securities Ex-
change Commission, recapitalizations under § 368(a) (1) (E), transfers to corporations
controlled by the transferors under § 351, and divisive reorganizations. See Comment,
69 YALE L.J. 1201, 1239-40 (1960). See also Cohen, Phillips, Surrey, Tarleau and
Warren, The Internal Revenme Code of 1954: Carry-overs and the Accumulated Earn-
ings Tax, 10 TAX L. REv. 277, 279-80 (1955).
21 For a general discussion of various possible interpretations of Libson Shops, see
Comment, 69 YAL L.J. 1201, 1216-32 (1960).
22 Because Libson Shops involved no change of ownership, and because there is no
economic difference between survival or dissolution of the loss corporation's entity in
merger or other acquisition of assets, arguably the same carryover law should apply
to both situations. See Comment, 69 YALE L.J. 1201, 1228 (1960). The policy argu-
ment against such an approach is that it would discourage shareholders from shifting
from an unprofitable business activity. See Becker, Loss Carryovers and the Libson
Shops Doctrine, 32 U. Cui. L. REv. 508, 523 (1965).
23 See cases cited in Churchill, Net Operating Losses and the Single Corporate
Taxpayer: The Lingering Specter of Libson Shops, 2 P-H TAX IDEAS 24,431 (1964);
Armstrong, New Barriers to Utilization of Operating Losses, 40 TAXES 867 (1960);
Cornfield, Net Operating Loss Deductions a;d the Continnity of Business Enterprise,
40 TAxEs 1019 (1960).
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ship, but measures change of ownership by an uncertain and judge-
made test. Section 382(a) would then be found to supersede Libson
Shops by requiring a fifty per cent change of ownership of voting
stock.
In defense of this line of reasoning, there is no question that
Libson Shops has caused considerable uncertainty and confusion in
the carryover area, and particularly in single corporation cases.24
While the courts have applied the doctrine only where there has
been both a change of business and of ownership, they have not
explicitly stated that change of ownership is an essential element.
The cases which have emphasized change of ownership do not provide
any definite criteria for measuring such change.2" The Commissioner
initially argued that change of business alone would invoke the doc-
trine."0 When this approach failed" he announced that he would rely
on Libson Shops to disallow carryovers when there was a change
of business and "more than a minor change in stock ownership," 8
which indicated that carryovers might be denied when the ownership
change was less than fifty per cent. The taxpayer might reasonably
argue that this makes the test of section 382(a) an unreliable tax
planning guide. By doing away with Libson Shops, the decision of
the court in the principal case does avoid such problems, but the
cost of such avoidance seems high.
Looking first at the principal case, it is apparent that the court was
dissatisfied with allowing the carryover."5 The purpose of the trans-
'4 See Friedman & Cuddihy, ilfullipying Cases Extend, But Do Not Clarify, Lib-
son Rule in Loss Carryover, 15 J. TAXATION 338 (1961).
25 Huyler's v. Commissioner, 327 F.2d 767 (7th Cir. 1964) (24% change of owner-
ship was "more than minor") ; Mill Ridge Coal Co. v. Patterson, 264 F.2d 713 (5th
Cir. 1959) (complete change of ownership) ; Kolker Bros., Inc., 35 T.C. 299 (1960)(46% change of ownership, carryover allowed. But court refused to hold that less
than 50% change of ownership was insufficient to deny carryover). For discussion of
these cases see Becker, supra note 22, at 518-22.
2 3 Kolker Bros., Inc., 35 T.C. 299 (1960).
27 Ibid.
25 Rev. Rul. 63-40, 1963-1 CuM. BULL. 46, 48:
[I]f there is more than a minor change in stock ownership of a loss corporation
which acquires a new business, the Service may continue to test the deductibility
of the carryover of the corporation's prior losses against income of the new busi-
ness enterprise.
20 Although not argued by the parties, the Ninth Circuit recommended that the
Commissioner apply § 482 to disallow the carryover in similar cases arising in the
future. 343 F.2d at 721. This section gives the Commissioner discretion to apporiton
income when two businesses are owned or controlled by the same interests and appor-
tionment is necessary to prevent tax evasion. Section 482 has been the Commissioner's
principal weapon where transactions between two related business units are manipu-
lated for tax purposes, such as fictitious sales, and does not seem designed to deal with
carryover problems. The Commissioner has apparently adopted the Ninth Circuit's
suggestion and will employ § 482 in future cases. T.I.R. 773, 657 CCH fI 6751 (Oct.
1966]
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action was tax avoidance. The combination of factors resulted in
practical control of the active business of the corporation by the
partners, and in ninety per cent of the benefit of the carryover going
to persons other than those who suffered the losses." If neither sec-
tion 269 nor section 382(a) reaches such an arrangement, and if
Libson Shops, however interpreted, is rejected, carryovers may well
become available through artful draftsmanship. Assuming such a
result is unacceptable, the bases of the court's decision must be
examined.
The court is correct that the legislative history of sections 381
and 382 indicates congressional desire for certainty and objectivity.
But the same congressional reports cited by the court show that section
382(a) was passed because it was felt that the carryover benefit
had been abused through utilization "by persons other than those
who incurred the loss."'" Further, in a report quoted in the opinion,
it is stated that, "whether or not the carryover is allowed should
be based upon economic realities rather than upon such artificialities
as the legal form of the transaction." 2 In sum, the legislative history
reveals the basic stress between the desire for clear-cut rules for the
taxpayer and the need for sufficient flexibility to prevent evasion
through technical manipulation. The decision in the principal case
fails to strike a sound balance between these two policies.
The court's conclusion that section 382(a) necessarily supersedes
Libson Shops is also open to question. The section does not provide
affirmative relief; rather, it denies the carryover in certain situations.
Thus there may be leeway for application of judicial doctrines when
a transaction violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the carryover
rules." This line of reasoning could open the way for use of Libson
Shops in any situation where it is felt the carryover should not be
allowed. For example, it has been argued that the change of business
requirement in single corporation cases has been given undue em-
13, 1965). A recent Tax Court decision disallowed a carryover on the basis of § 482.
Pauline W. Ach, 42 T.C. 114 (1964). For a general discussion of § 482 see Hewitt,
Section 482-Reallocation of Income and Deductions Between Related Persons-Up
To Date, N.Y.U. 22d INsT. O N FED. TAx 381 (1964).
30 It has been argued that the fault in the decision in the principal case resulted
from the court's failure to see that the pertinent question was whether the taxpayer
was a "corporation," under § 7701 (a) (1), as opposed to two corporations. Brock,
supra note 3, at 591. Whether or not this would have been the appropriate analysis,
the court proceeded on the basis that the situation was that of a single corporate
taxpayer.31 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954).
32 343 F.2d at 718, citing H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954).33 See Becker, supra note 22, at 531.
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phasis, and that, even if the business is continued, the carryover
should be denied every time there is a fifty per cent or greater change
of ownership."' It seems unlikely, however, that a court would adopt
any test which was radically different from the approach of section
382(a).
Before turning to the possible role of Libson Shops under the
1954 Code, the implications of the Ninth Circuit's dictum-to the
effect that Libson Shops is inapplicable in all cases-must be briefly
considered. Unlike section 382(a), section 381 is affirmative, pro-
viding that the carryover will be allowed in certain tax-free trans-
actions unless further restricted by the twenty per cent continuity of
interest requirement of section 382 (b). If a transaction qualifies
under section 381 it would be difficult to find any basis for applying
Libson Shops to disallow the carryover; in such cases, Libson Shops
is superseded." But section 381 does not cover all the multiple cor-
poration transactions in which a carryover may be valuable,3 6 and,
if Libson Shops cannot be applied to these cases, serious abuse of
the carryover privilege may arise. The most obvious example is a
"type (B)" reorganization under section 368." It would be possible
to effect a (B) reorganization, subsequently liquidate the acquired
subsidiary, and utilize its carryover. Unless the court recognized that
such a transaction was functionally equivalent to a "type (C)" re-
organization, the only continuity of interest limitation on the trans-
action would be that of section 368 which may require retention of
far less than twenty per cent of the stock." It does not appear that
the Ninth Circuit based its dictum on a thorough examination of
the complexities involved in section 381, and it is doubtful that a
court faced with such an issue would give weight to the conclusion.
The limitations of the statutory framework make it clear that
courts face the difficult task of relating the various 1954 Code sec-
tions and providing rational controls on carryovers when the 1954
Code is inapplicable. It seems likely that the Libson Shops doctrine
will continue to be argued. Of particular relevance for the single
34 Id. at 524-25.
3 The Commissioner has stated that he will not apply Libson Shops to such trans-
actions. Rev. Rul. 58-603, 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 147; Rev. Rul. 59-395, 1959-2 Cuom.
BULL. 475.
30 See note 20 smpra.
7 On (B) reorganizations, see generally BIrrKER, op .cit. supra note 4, at 363.38 See Comment, 69 YA.E L.J. 1201, 1240 n.174 (1960). For discussion of the con-
tinuity of interest doctrine in reorganization transactions see BIrtER, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 393-99.
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corporation situations is the Commissioner's recently announced dis-
agreement with the Ninth Circuit's decision in the principal case,
and his present policy in the case of loss corporations which purchase
a profitable business. The Service had indicated that it might rely
on Libson Shops when the change of ownership was less than fifty
per cent.39 This policy has been dropped in favor of greater emphasis
on the ownership test of section 382(a), and, henceforth, Libson
Shops will not be relied upon unless there has been a fifty per cent
or greater change in the "beneficial ownership" of the loss."0 This
approach attempts to insure that it is the same person who suffered
the losses that benefits from the carryover, and its usefulness in the
principal case is obvious.
It may be questioned, however, whether the statutory framework
justifies exclusive concentration on the carryover returns of the trans-
action. Even if there is more than a fifty per cent change of owner-
ship, section 382(a) allows the carryover as long as the business is
continued. The purchaser may or may not pay an immediate pre-
mium for the carryover, but no examination of the amount of the
benefit received will be made. 1 The requirement of fifty per cent
change of voting stock itself seems undermined by sections 381
and 382(b). Unless business considerations interfere, it is as easy
to acquire assets in a tax-free reorganization as in a taxable trans-
action,"2 and thereby retain the carryover despite an eighty per cent
change of ownership. It seems unlikely that a court would require
fifty per cent of the benefits of the carryover to go to the holders
of twenty per cent of the stock. Aside from the difficulty of integra-
tion into the 1954 Code, such a test might be used to prevent valid
business transactions. Shareholders of a loss corporation, desirous
of changing to a profitable activity, may find that the only means
of raising funds or acquiring other assets is to sell preferred stock.
39 See note 28 supra.
40 T.I.R. 773, 657 CCH 6751 (Oct. 13, 1965).
41 It has been argued that it is contrary to the purposes of the carryover privilege
to permit payment of a direct premium for the carryover. Becker, supra note 22, at
524. This approach apparently underlies § 382(b), which focuses solely on change of
ownership in an attempt to require the loss corporation shareholders to recover their
losses through a continuing interest in the corporation. Allowance of the carryover
when there is complete change of ownership seems to contradict this policy. However,
this possibility may not have been regarded as serious in fact because of the difficulty of
producing profits from a losing concern without making substantial changes in the
business.
42 For this reason it has been argued that Libson Shops should be used in multiple,
merger of the requirement of § 382(a) of 50% change of ownership. Becker, supra
note 22, at 528.
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Unlike the transaction in the principal case, the preferred stockholders
may have no control over the management of the business. In such
a situation it would not be wise to disallow the carryover simply
because fifty per cent of the carryover benefits went to the new,
preferred stockholders. It is clear that any satisfactory solution to
such problems requires a thorough re-examination of the purpose and
function of loss carryovers in tax law.
HUSBAND'S IMMUNITY FROM PERSONAL SUIT
FOR TORT
Plaintiff brought an action to recover damages for injuries which
were intentionally inflicted by her former husband subsequent to the
initiation of divorce proceedings. The complaint alleged that defend-
ant, with intent to kill plaintiff and in violation of a non-molesta-
tion order, repeatedly rammed plaintiff's automobile with his own.
Defendant challenged plaintiff's right to sue, claiming immunity from
suit by his former wife for personal tort occurring during marriage. The
trial court granted judgment for defendant on the pleadings, which was
affirmed on appeal. Held: A man is immune from suit in tort by his
former wife, even though the tort was intentional and was inflicted
after divorce proceedings had been initiated. Fisher v. Toler, 194 Kan.
701,401 P.2d 1012 (1965).
At common law a married woman had no legal existence separate
from that of her husband, and could bring no cause of action against
him.' Married Women's Property Acts were enacted in an attempt to
alleviate this common law inequity by granting the wife the right to
manage her own property and to sue in her own name. For the most
part, these acts do not deal explicitly with the question of personal torts
between spouses.' A majority of courts interpret this silence as limiting
the wife's right to sue her husband to property questions.' An increasing
number of jurisdictions, however, permit recovery for some or all
I Under the medieval concept of unity, the husband and wife were "one person in
law, so that the very being and existence of the woman is suspended during cover-
ture .... ." 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 889 (Lewis ed. 1898).
2 Only New York, North Carolina, and Wisconsin provide specifically for personal
tort suits between spouses. N.Y. Dom. REL. LA w § 57; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.1(1963); Wis. STAT. § 246.075 (1955). Illinois specifically forbids tort actions between
spouses. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (1953). See Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 632 (1955).
3 McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 Vn.L. L. REv. 303, 313-14
(1959). The wife's disability to sue her husband for personal tort was considered to be
substantive as well as procedural, and the statutes removed only the procedural dis-
ability. Ibid.
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